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Abstract. This paper studies the resilient routing and (in-band) fast
failover mechanisms supported in Software-Dened Networks (SDN). We
analyze the potential benets and limitations of such failover mechanisms,
and focus on two main metrics: (1) correctness (in terms of connectivity
and loop-freeness) and (2) load-balancing. We make the following contri-
butions. First, we show that in the worst-case (i.e., under adversarial link
failures), the usefulness of local failover is rather limited: already a small
number of failures will violate connectivity properties under any fast
failover policy, even though the underlying substrate network remains
highly connected. We then present randomized and deterministic algo-
rithms to compute resilient forwarding sets; these algorithms achieve an
almost optimal tradeo. Our worst-case analysis is complemented with a
simulation study.
1 Introduction
The software-dened networking (SDN) paradigm separates the control plane from
the network data plane, and introduces a (software) controller that manages the
ows in the network from a (logically) centralized perspective. This architecture
has the potential to make the network management and operation more exible
and simpler, and to enable faster innovation also in the network core. For example,
the controller may exploit application and network state information (including
the switches under its control) to optimize the routing of the ows through the
network, e.g., to implement isolation properties or improve performance.
However, the separation of the control from the data plane may have draw-
backs. For example, a reactive ow control can introduce higher latencies due to
the interaction of the switch with the remote controller. Moreover, the separation
raises the question of what happens if the switches lose connectivity to the con-
troller. One solution to mitigate these problems is to keep certain functionality
closer to the switches or in the data plane [8].
An important tradeo occurs in the context of network failures: Theoretically,
e.g., a link failure, is best handled by the controller which has the logic to
? Michael Borokhovich was supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation (grant
894/09).update forwarding rules according to the current network policies. However, as
the indirection via the controller may take too long, modern network designs
incorporate failover (or \backup") paths into the (switches' or routers') forwarding
tables. For example, OpenFlow (since the 1.1 specication [5]), incorporates such
a fast failover mechanism: it allows to predene resilient and in-band failover
routes which kick in upon a topological change. Only after the failover took place,
the controller may learn about the new situation and install forwarding (and
failover) rules accordingly.
Our Contributions. Given that the in-band failover tables need to be
pre-computed and the corresponding rules are based on limited local network
information only, we ask the question: \Can you shoot in your foot with local
fast failover?" We formalize a simplied local failover problem, and rst assume
a conservative (or worst-case) perspective where link failures are chosen by an
adversary who knows the entire network and all the pre-installed failover rules.
For this setting, we provide a lower bound which shows that a safe fast failover
can potentially come at a high network load, especially if the failover rules are
destination-based only (Section 2). We then present randomized and deterministic
algorithms to pre-compute resilient forwarding sets and show that the algorithms
are (almost) optimal in the sense that they match the lower bound mentioned
above (Section 3). Finally, we report on a simulation study (Section 4) which
indicates that under random link failures, local fast failover performs better in
general. In the Appendix, we give the formal specication of the two additional
algorithms used in our simulations, and we extend the discussion to alternative
adversary and trac models.
Model and Terminology. We attend to the following model. We assume
an SDN-network G = (V;E) with n switches (or nodes) V = fv1;:::;vng (e.g.,
OpenFlow switches) connected by bidirectional links E. We assume that all nodes
are directly connected, i.e., G forms a full mesh (a clique). This network serves an
all-to-one communication pattern where any node vi 2 V n fvng communicates
with a single destination vn; in other words, we have n 1 communicating (source-
destination) pairs. Henceforth, by slightly abusing terminology, we will refer to
the corresponding n   1 communication paths as the ows F = ff1;:::;fn 1g.
The source-destination ows are unsplittable, i.e., each ow fi 8i 2 f1;:::;kg
travels along a single path. For simplicity, we will assume that all ows fi carry a
constant amount of trac w = w(fi), and that edge capacities e 2 E are innite.
In order to ensure an ecient failover, each switch v 2 V can store the
following kind of failover rules: Each rule r 2 R considers a specic local failure
scenario, namely the set of failed incident links, and denes an alternative
forwarding port for each source-destination pair. (This is slightly more general
than what is provided e.g., by OpenFlow today: in OpenFlow, all paths need
to resort to the same failover port, rending the connectivity-load tradeo even
worse.)
Formally, let  (v) 8v 2 V denote the links (or equivalently: the switch ports)
incident to node v in G, and let FW(v) dene how the source-destination pairs (or
ows) that are routed via node v (the \forwarding set"). A rule r is of the form:r :
 
2 (v);FW(v)

7! FW(v); that is, for each possible failure scenario 2 (v) (i.e.,
the subset of ports which failed at v), the failover rule denes an alternative set
of forwarding rules FW(v) at v. Note that the number of rules can theoretically be
large; however, as we will see, small rule tables are sucient for the algorithms
presented in this paper.
We study failover schemes that pursue two goals: (1) Correctness: Each
source-destination pair is connected by a valid path; there are no forwarding
loops. (2) Performance: The resulting ow allocations are well balanced. Formally,
we want to minimize the load of the maximally loaded link in G after the failover:
minmaxe2E (e), where (e) describes the number of ows fi crossing edge e.
Henceforth, let b  = maxe2E (e) denote the maximum load.
For our randomized failover schemes, we will typically state our results with
high probability (short: w.h.p.): this means that the corresponding claim holds
with at least polynomial probability 1 1=nc for an arbitrary constant c. Moreover,
throughout this paper, log will refer to the binary logarithm.
2 You must shoot in your foot!
Let us rst investigate the limitations of local failover mechanisms from a con-
servative worst-case perspective. Concretely, we will show that even in a fully
meshed network (i.e., a clique), a small number of link failures can either quickly
disrupt connectivity (i.e., the forwarding path of at least one source-destination
pair is incorrect), or entail a high load. This is true even though the remaining
physical network is still well connected: the minimum edge cut (short: mincut) is
high, and there still exist many disjoint paths connecting each source-destination
pair.
Theorem 1. No local failover scheme can tolerate n   1 or more link failures
without disconnecting source-destination pairs, even though the remaining graph
(i.e., after the link failures) is still
n
2

  1-connected.
Proof. We consider a physical network that is fully meshed, and we assume a
trac matrix where all nodes communicate with a single destination vn. To prove
our claim, we will construct a set of links failures that creates a loop, for any local
failover scheme. Consider a ow v1 ! vn connecting the source-destination pair
(v1;vn). The idea is that whenever the ow from v1 would be directly forwarded
to vn in the absence of failures, we fail the corresponding physical link: that is,
if v1 would directly forward to vn, we fail (v1;vn). Similarly, if v1 forwards to
(the backup) node vi, and if vi would send to vn, we fail (vi;vn), etc. We do so
until the number of intermediate (backup) nodes for the ow v1 ! vn becomes n
2

  1. This will require at most
n
2

  1 failures (of links to vn) since every
such failure adds at least one intermediate node.
In the following, let us assume that the last link on the path v1 ! vn is
(vk;vn). We simultaneously fail all the links (vk;v), where v are all the nodes
that are not the intermediate nodes on the path v1 ! vn, and not v1. So, there
are n  
 n
2

  1

  1 nodes v (the last minus 1 accounts for v1). By failing thelinks to v, we left vk without a valid routing choice: All the remaining links
from vk point to nodes which are already on the path v1 ! vn, and a loop is
inevitable.
In total, we have at most
n
2

 1+n 
 n
2

  1

 1 = n 1 failures. Notice,
that the two nodes with the smallest degrees in the graph are the nodes vn and
vk. The latter is true since the rst
n
2

  1 failures were used to disconnect
links to vn, and another n  
n
2

failures were used to disconnect links from vk.
Formally, d(vn) = (n   1)  
 n
2

  1

  1, where the last minus 1 accounts for
the link (vk;vn). So, d(vn) = n   1  
n
2

 n
2   1. And regarding the degree of
vk, we have: d(vk) = (n   1)  
 
n  
n
2

=
n
2

  1. All the other nodes have a
degree of n   2.
The network is still
n
2

  1 connected: the mincut of the network is at least n
2

  1. Consider some cut with k nodes on the one side of the cut, and n   k
nodes on the other side. Obviously, one of the sets has a size of at most
n
2

; let
us denote this smaller set by S. If S includes at least one of the nodes V nfvk;vng,
then the number of outgoing edges form the set is at least n  2  (jSj  1), thus
the mincut is at least n
2   1. If S includes only both vk and vn, the mincut is at
least n  1 (the link (vk;vn) was failed). If only one of the nodes fvk;vng is in S,
then the mincut is at least
n
2

  1. 
Regarding the maximal link load, we have the following lower bound.
Theorem 2. For any local failover scheme tolerating ' link failures (0 < ' < n)
without disconnecting any source-destination pair, there exists a failure scenario
which results in a link load of at least b  
p
', although the minimum edge cut
(mincut) of the network is still at least n   '   1.
Proof. Let us rst describe an adversarial strategy that induces a high load: Recall
that in the absence of failures, each node vi (i 6= n) may use its direct link to
vn for forwarding. However, after some links failed, vi may need to resort to the
remaining (longer) paths from vi to vn. Since the failover scheme S tolerates '
failures and vi remains connected to vn, S will fail over to one of ' + 1 possible
paths. To see this, let v
j
i (j 2 [1;:::;']) be one of the ' possible last hops on
the path (vi !  ! v
j
i ! vn), and let us consider the paths generated by S:
(vi ! vn);
(vi !  ! v1
i ! vn);
(vi !  ! v1
i !  ! v2
i ! vn);
:::
(vi !  ! v1
i !  ! v2
i !  ! v
'
i ! vn):
For example, the path (vi !  ! v1
i ! vn) will be generated if the rst failure
is link (vi;vn), and the path (vi !  ! v1
i !  ! v2
i ! vn) if the second
failure is link (v1
i ;vn) (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Notice that the last hop v
j
i
is unique for every path; otherwise, the loop-freeness property would be violated.vn
vi
vn
v1
i
vi
vn
v1
i
vi
v2
i
vn
v1
i
v3
i
vi
v2
i
Fig.1. From left to right: failover path (vi ! vn) where each time the last hop
to vn is failed.
For each i 2 [1;:::;n   1] (i.e., for each possible source) consider the set
Ai = fvi;v1
i ;:::;v
p
'
i g, and accordingly, the multiset
S
i Ai is of size j
S
i Aij =
(n 1)(
p
'+1) many nodes. Since we have n 1 distinct nodes (we do not count
vn), by a counting argument, there exists a node w 2
S
i Ai which appears in at
least
p
' sets Ai.
If for each i such that w 2 Ai, the adversary will cause vi to route to vn via
w, then the load of the link (w;vn) will be at least
p
'. This can be achieved by
failing at most
p
' links to vn in each such set Ai. Thus, the adversary will fail p
' 
p
' = ' links incident to vn, while the maximum loaded link (w;vn) will
have a load of at least
p
'.
It remains to prove that the network remains highly connected, despite these
failures: The proof is simple. In a clique network without failures, the mincut
is n   1. In the worst case, each link failure will remove one link from some
cut, and hence the mincut must eventually be at least n   '   1. By the same
argument, there are at least n   '   1 many disjoint paths from each node vi to
the destination: initially, without failures, there are n   1 disjoint paths (a direct
one and n   1 indirect ones), and each failure aects at most one path. 
Interestingly, it can be proved analogously that if a failover rule only depends
on destination addresses, the situation is even worse.
Theorem 3. Consider any local destination-based failover scheme in a clique
graph. There exists a set of ' failures (0 < ' < n), such that the remaining graph
will have a mincut of n   '   1 and b   ':
Proof. In order to construct a bad example, we rst fail the direct link (v1;vn),
and hence v1 will need to reroute to some path with the last node before vn
being some node vi. When we fail the link (vi;vn), vi will have to reroute and
some other node vj will become the last hop on the path to vn. We repeat this
strategy to fail the links from the newly selected last hop and the destination
vn. This results in a routing path v1 !  ! vi !  ! vj !  ! w ! vn
with at least ' intermediate nodes. Since the algorithm is destination-based, i.e.,
forwarding rules depend only on the destination address of a packet, the load
on the link (w;vn) will be at least ' + 1: all the nodes on the path v1 ! vn will
send their packets via the same route. 3 How not to shoot in your foot!
We have seen that what can be achieved with local fast failover is rather limited.
On the positive side, this section shows that there exist algorithms to pre-
compute failover schemes which at least match the derived lower bounds: we
present algorithms to pre-compute robust failover paths that jointly optimize the
loop-freeness property and the load, i.e., nd an almost optimal tradeo.
Naturally, randomization can help to spread the communication load well, but
we must ensure that paths remain loop-free. We rst present such a randomized
solution, discuss how to derandomize it, and nally look at deterministic failover
algorithms.
We introduce a family of failover schemes S which can be represented in a
generic matrix form i;j. Any failover scheme instance in this family will always
forward a message directly to the destination if the corresponding link is available.
Otherwise, if a given node vi cannot reach the destination vn via (vi;vn), it will
resort to the sequence of alternatives represented as the row i in the matrix i;
(the \backup nodes" for vi): vi will rst try to forward to node i;1, if this link is
not available to node i;2, and so on. Similarly and more generally, starting from
node i;j, if the link (i;j;vn) is not available, the failover scheme will try i;j+1,
i;j+2, etc. In summary, the matrix representation can be depicted as follows:
1;1;1;2;:::;1;n 2
:::
i;1;i;2;:::;i;n 2
:::
n 1;1;n 1;2;:::;n 1;n 2
The following auxiliary claim characterizes the best adversarial strategy
against the failover schemes S.
Claim 4 For the family of failover schemes S, the highest load is induced if links
towards the destination node vn are failed.
Proof. To achieve a load of ' on some link, the adversary rst needs to bring
at least ' ows to some node w. Consider a failover sequence i; in which w is
located at j's position, i.e., i;j = w. In order to bring the ow vi ! vn to node
w, the adversary needs to fail at least j links (every failure requires at most a
single additional backup node). Thus, the adversary can remove the links to the
destination from every node i;k;k < j and from the source vi. The optimality is
due to the fact that once one of the nodes i;k;k < j appears in other sequences,
these failures are automatically reused: the links (i;k;vn) already failed. If the
adversary would instead choose to fail other links (not towards the destination),
e.g., (i;j;i;j+1) , the failures can only be reused if the same link (and not only
an endpoint) appears in other sequences before w. Therefore, we conclude that
the strategy of failing the links to the destination is optimal: (1) it requires nomore failures to bring a specic ow to w than any other strategy, and (2) link
failures to the destination can strictly be reused more often than the failures of
links to any other nodes. 
3.1 Randomized Failover
What does a good failover matrix i;j look like? Naively, one may choose the matrix
entries (i.e., the \failover ports") uniformly at random from the set of next hops
which are still available, and depending on the source and destination address, in
order to balance the load. However, note that a random and independent choice
will quickly introduce loops in the forwarding sequences: it is likely that a switch
will forward trac to a switch which was already visited before on the failover
path.
Thus, our randomized failover scheme RFS will choose random permutations,
i.e., for a source-destination pair (vi;vn), the sequence i;1;i;2;:::;i;n 2 (with
i;j 2 V nfvi;vng) is always loop-free (deterministically). Technically, RFS draws
all i;j uniformly at randomly from V n fvi;vng but eliminates repetitions (e.g.,
by redrawing a repeated node). We can show that RFS is almost optimal, in the
following sense.
Theorem 5. Using the RFS scheme, in order to create a maximum load of
b  =
p
', the adversary will have to fail at least 


'
log n

links w.h.p., where
0 < ' < n.
Proof. To create a link load of
p
' with the minimal number of link failures, the
adversary must in particular be able to route at least
p
' ows to some node
w. Given the
p
' load on the node, in the best case (for the adversary), the
entire ow will be forwarded by w on a single outgoing link. (E.g., the link to
the destination vn.) We will show that w.h.p., it is impossible for the adversary
to route more than
p
' ows to a single node.
The adversary can put a high load on some node w only if: 1) Node w is
located close to the beginning of many sequences (i.e., is in a small \prex" of
the sequences); thus, a small number of failures is sucient to redirect the ow
to w. 2) Many nodes appearing before w in the sequence prexes occur early
in many other prexes as well; thus, the adversary can \reuse" failed links to
redirect also other source-destination pairs. Note that these two requirements
may conict, but to prove the lower bound on the number of required failures,
we can assume that both conditions are satised: the set of
p
' sequences with
the largest number of node repetitions in the w-prexes also have the shortest
w-prexes.
With this intuition in mind, let us compute the probability that a node w
appears more than approximately logn times at position j. Let Y
j
i be an indicator
random variable that indicates whether w is located at position j 2 [1;:::;n 2] in
sequence i 2 [1;:::;n 1]. Let Y j =
Pn
i=1 Y
j
i be a random variable representing
the number of times that w appears at position j. Since the failover sequences are
random, Pr(Y
j
i = 1) = 1
n 2 (w is neither the source nor the destination) and thus,8j;E

Y j
= n 1
n 2. Applying the Cherno bound on the sum of n i.i.d. Poisson
trials, we obtain (for any  > 0):
Pr
 
Y j > (1 + )E

Y j
 2
 E[Y
j]
Pr

Y j >
(1 + 3logn)(n   1)
n   2

 2
 (3log n)
n 1
n 2
 2 3log n = 1=n3:
Let us denote z =
(1+3log n)(n 1)
n 2 and rewrite:
Pr
 
Y j > z

 1=n3:
We can now apply a union bound argument3 over all possible nodes w and over
all possible positions j, which yields that with probability at least 1   1
n, any
node will appear no more than z times at each position.
The adversary needs to select the
p
' sequences with the shortest w-prexes.
For a chosen sequence i, let us denote by ki the prex length for node w (the
prex length includes w itself). Since each node will appear no more than z times
at each position (with probability of at least 1  1
n) the minimum length of a total
prex for any node w can be derived. Let us denote the minimum total prex by
k. Clearly, k is minimized for the shortest possible prexes ki. According to the
analysis above, with high probability, there are no more than z prexes of length
1, no more than z prexes of length 2, and so on. Therefore:
k =
p
' X
i=1
ki 
z X
i=1
1 +
z X
i=1
2 +  +
z X
i=1
p
'
z
= z

1 + 2 +  +
p
'
z

=
' +
p
'z
2z

'
2z

'
8logn
: (1)
Eq. 1 is true since for n  6,
(1+3log n)(n 1)
n 2  8logn.
In conclusion, we know that in order to achieve a load of
p
', the adversary
has to fail the entire total prex of w that consists of at least
'
8log n nodes.
However, the nodes in the prexes are not necessarily all distinct, and the number
of links the adversary needs to fail only depends on the distinct nodes in the total
prex of the node w. The latter is true due to the fact that the best adversarial
strategy is to fail only the links to the destination since in this case every such
failure is reused once the same node appears again in the total prex of w (see
Claim 4). Hence, we next compute the minimum number of distinct nodes D
in any set of k random nodes. As we are interested in lower bounding D, we
can choose k minimal, i.e., k =
'
8log n. The analysis follows from a balls-and-bins
3 The union bound argument says that the probability of the union of the events is no
greater than the sum of the probabilities of the individual events.argument where bins represent node IDs and balls are the k positions that should
be failed by the adversary. Thus, D is a number of occupied bins (i.e., bins that
contain at least one ball). Let Di be a binary random variable indicating that the
i-th ball falls into an empty bin (i.e., D =
Pk
i=1 Di). So, Pr(Di = 1)  n 1 k
n 1 .
Since k =
'
8log n and ' < n, we obtain that:
Pr(Di = 1) 
n   1   k
n   1

8logn   1
8logn
 0:8:
Thus, E[D] = kE[Di]  0:8k: Now we can apply the Cherno bound (for any
 2 (0;1]):
Pr(D  (1   )0:8k)  Pr(D  (1   )E[D])
 e E[D]
2=2  e 0:8k
2=2:
By taking  = 0:5 we obtain Pr(D  0:4k)  e 0:1k:
It remains to prove that this bound still holds under the union bound for
all
 n 1 p
'

possible sets of sequences that the adversary can choose. In other
words, we have to ensure that
  n p
'

e 0:1k  1
n (we took a larger number, since:
  n p
'


 n 1 p
'

).

n
p
'

e 0:1k  n
p
'e 0:1k = n
p
'e
 
'
80 log n (2)
= e
p
'lnn 
'
80 log n = e
'

ln n p
'   1
80 log n

 e
'

log n p
'   1
80 log n

:
For '  822 log
4 n, we have (
log n p
'   1
80log n)   2
822 log n, and hence
  n p
'

e 0:1k 
e
 2'
822 log n  e 2log
3 n  1
n2. Since
  n p
'

Pr(D  0:4k) =
  n p
'

Pr(D 
0:4'
8log n)  1
n2,
w.h.p., any set of
p
' sequences (i.e., w-prexes) will require 
(
'
log n) failures. 
3.2 Deterministic Failover
Theoretically, the result of Theorem 5 can be derandomized, i.e., the RFS scheme
can deterministically ensure low loads. The idea is that we could verify whether
an (improbable) situation occurred and the random sequences generated by RFS
actually yield a high load (we just need to check all possible loads at any w); if
so, another set of random permutations is generated. However, this verication
is computationally expensive.
We hence now initiate the discussion of ecient deterministic schemes. In
particular, we propose an optimal failover scheme (which matches our lower
bound in Section 2), at least for small '. Similar to RFS, the deterministic
failover scheme DFS is dened by a failover matrix i;j; however, here i;j will
simply refer to a node's index (and not the node itself): We dene the index ofany node v` to be ` 1, i.e., the nodes fv1;v2;:::;vng are mapped to the indices
f0;1;:::;n   1g. Given a destination node vn, DFS is dened by the following
index matrix:
1;2;4;8;:::;

0 + 2blog nc

mod n
2;3;5;9;:::;

1 + 2blog nc

mod n
3;4;6;10:::;

2 + 2blog nc

mod n
:::
In general, the index in sequence i 2 [1;:::;n 1] at position j 2 [1;:::;blognc]
is i;j = (i   1) + 2j 1 mod n. For example, if the link (v1;vn) fails, v1 will
reroute via the node with index 1, i.e., via v2; and so on. We can show the
following result.
Theorem 6. The DFS scheme achieves a maximum load of b  = O(
p
') in any
scenario with ' < blognc failures.
Proof. We will prove something even stronger: the adversary cannot choose link
failures such that any node w forwards more than
p
' ows. Clearly, an upper
bound on the node load is an upper bound on the (incident) links: in the worst
case, w will forward all trac to the same link. To create a high load at some
node w, the adversary needs to nd failover sequences in the matrix i;j where
the node w appears close to the beginning of the sequence, and fail all the links
(vi;vn), where vi is a node preceding w in a sequence: i.e., the adversary fails the
total prex of w. Note that failing the links to the destination is the best strategy
for the adversary as failures are automatically reusable in other sequences (see
Claim 4).
The following two claims will help us to show that the adversary wastes its
entire failure budget in order to achieve a maximum load of
p
'.
Claim 7 Every node index participates in only blognc sequences.
Proof. The DFS failover matrix is dened as i;j = (i 1)+2j 1 mod n, where
i 2 [1;:::;n   1] and j 2 [1;:::;blognc]. From this construction, it follows that
there are no index repetitions in the matrix columns. Since there are blognc
columns, the claim follows. 
Claim 8 For any node index `, all `-prexes (sets of indices preceding ` in the
sequences) are disjoint.
Proof. Let us dene m = i   1 and k = `   1. The index in sequence m 2
[0;:::;n   2] at position k 2 [0;:::;blognc   1] is m + 2k mod n. Consider
a sequence m0 where the index w appears at position k0 and a sequence m00
where the index ` appears at position k00. Without loss of generality, assume thatk00 > k0. Let m0 +2k

mod n and m00 +2k

mod n represent the indices in the
prexes of ` in sequences m0 and m00 accordingly. Assume by contradiction that
these indices are the same. We have that
m0 + 2k
0
= m00 + 2k
00
mod n
m0 + 2k

= m00 + 2k

mod n (assumption)
and hence
m0   m00 = 2k
00
  2k
0
+ n  C1
m0   m00 = 2k

  2k

+ n  C2
Therefore
2k

  2k
00
+ 2k
0
  2k

= n  C3
where C1;C2 and C3 are some integer constants.
Notice that max(2k

;2k
00
;2k
0
;2k

) < n, so the only possible values for C3
are: f 1;0;1g. Moreover, (2k

  2k
00
) < 0, while (2k
0
  2k

) > 0, and since the
absolute value of these dierences is bounded by 2blog nc 1  0:5n, we can write:
 0:5n < 2k

  2k
00
+ 2k
0
  2k

< 0:5n:
Thus, 0 remains the only possible value for C3. The values f2k

;2k
00
;2k
0
;2k

g
are distinct since there are no repetitions in the columns of the sequence matrix.
Since 2k
00
> 2k

+ 2k
0
+ 2k

, due to a geometric series argument (the largest
element is greater than the sum of all previous elements), we can state that
2k

  2k
00
+ 2k
0
  2k

< 0:
We conclude that there is no integer constant C3 satisfying our assumption
m0 + 2k

= m00 + 2k

mod n (i.e., there are two identical indices in the `-
prexes). 
Armed with these claims, we are ready to continue with the proof. Since all
prexes are disjoint, the adversary cannot reuse failures of one ow for another.
Thus, the adversary will be able to route one ow to w using a single failure (by
nding a sequence in which w appears at the rst position); to add another ow,
the adversary takes a sequence i in which w is located at position 2 and will
fail the links (vi;vn), and (v(i;1)+1;vn). And so on. Thus, the number of used
failures can be represented as
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 +  + L  '2
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where L is the number of ows passing through w on the way to the destination
vn. So:
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 +  + L  '
L(L + 1)
2
 '
L <
p
2':
Note that the index of the destination node (n   1 in our case) can appear
inside the failover sequences. In this case, the index will be skipped since the
link to it from the source already failed. By skipping one index, we shorten the
failover sequence by 1, and since every sequence has length blognc, our failover
scheme holds for any ' < blognc.  1
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4 Beyond Worst-Case Failures
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Fig.5. Max load in all-to-all communi-
cation.
To complement our worst-case bounds,
we conducted simulations with dier-
ent failure scenarios. (1) Ran: links
are failed uniformly at random; (2)
Ecl (an \eclipse attack"): links are
removed at random around destina-
tion vn. We used two trac patterns.
(1) Single dest: one unit of ow from
each node to vn; (2) all-to-all: one
unit of ow from each node to every
other node. In addition to our failover
schemes RFS and DFS, we also simu-
late the following naive strategies. (1)
Bal (\balanced"): If the destination
cannot be reached directly, forward to
an available port chosen uniformly at
random (depending on the destination
and the set of failed links). This strat-
egy seeks to balance trac but does
not ensure loop-freeness. (2) Rob (\robust"): If the destination cannot be reached,
forward to the available neighboring switch which has the lowest identier (in a
modulo manner, and assuming that switches have unique identiers). We start
with the single dest trac pattern. Figure 4 (left) plots the load as a function of
the number of failed links under Ecl. (Note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis.)
We observe that compared to Theorem 5 which deals with worst-case failures,
RFS performs signicantly better: while our conservative bound suggests that
to create a load of 10 =
p
', '=logn = 100=log500 = 11:15 failures are needed,
more than 300 are necessary in our experiment. Moreover, we observe that RFSyields a much lower load than the naive approach Rob; for the single-destination
scenario, Bal is similar to Rob and is not shown explicitly here. The DFS
algorithm also gives a low load; however, it is only dened up to a certain ' (see
Theorem 6). The variance of these experiments is typically small, see the boxplot
in Figure 4 (right).
As expected, under Ran failures, the load is generally lower, and our scheme
can tolerate more failures without creating loops (see Figure 2).
As the maximal link load reveals a partial picture only, Figure 3 studies the
load distribution over multiple links (under Ecl), once for 150 failures (left) and
once for 450 failures (right). Obviously, most links hardly contain more than one
or two ows under RFS; again, under the naive Rob strategy (and similarly for
Bal), the situation is worse.
Let us have a look at alternative trac matrices. Figure 5 shows the results
for an all-to-all communication pattern (under Ran). Interestingly, for RFS, the
load is not much higher than in the single-destination scenario; this conrms the
good load-balancing properties of RFS. However, we also see that DFS performs
poorly and needs to be generalized for the multi-destination scenario. Finally, we
note that in this scenario, we can exploit Bal's exibility and in contrast to the
single destination case, the algorithm signicantly outperforms Rob (in terms of
load).
5 Related Work
This work is motivated by the trend towards Software-Dened Networking and
in particularly the fast failover mechanism which supports the in-band masking
of failures (see Section 5.8 of the OpenFlow 1.1 specication). However, as the
convergence time of routing algorithms is often relatively high compared to packet
forwarding speeds, ranging from 10s of milliseconds to seconds depending on the
network [1], many networks today incorporate some robustness already in the
forwarding tables of a router or switch: Thus, robust routing concepts and link
protection schemes have been studied intensively for many years, also outside
SDN.
For example, robust Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) supports local
and global path protection to compute shortest backup paths around an outage
area [6,10], where \shortest" is often meant in terms of congestion [7,11]. Related
to our connectivity and load-balancing tradeo is also the work by Suchara et
al. [9] who analyze how to jointly optimize trac engineering and failure recovery
from pre-installed MPLS backup paths. However, in contrast to our paper, their
solution is path-based and not local, and the focus is on robust optimization.
Alternative solutions to make routing more resilient rely on special header bits
(e.g., to determine when to switch from primary to backup paths, as in MPLS Fast
Reroute [6], or to encode failure information to make failure-aware forwarding
decisions [2,4]), or on y table modications [3]. Recently, Feigenbaum et al. [1]
made an interesting rst step towards a better theoretical understanding of
resilient SDN tables. The authors prove that routing tables can provide guaranteedresilience (i.e., loop-freeness) against a single failure, when the network remains
connected.
6 Conclusion
So, will or won't you shoot in your foot with fast failover? Our results show
that there exists an interesting tradeo between a \safe" and \ecient" failover.
The usefulness of the local failover depends on whether link failures are rather
adversarial or random, and on how exibly the failover rules can be specied.
In particular, we have seen that the possibilities of destination-based failover
schemes are very limited. But also more expressive failover schemes where ows
can be forwarded depending on arbitrary local matching rules (this is more
general than today's OpenFlow specication), can lead to high network loads
in the worst case. On the positive side, relatively simple algorithms exist which
match these lower bounds.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Chen Avin for valuable discus-
sions and advice.
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The Bal algorithm is executed sequentially for each node vi and for each failed
link incident to vi chooses the new next hop based on the current node (vi) and
the second end of the currently failed link.
Algorithm 1 Bal
Input: current node { vi, second end of failed link { vj
Output: new next hop
1: if i > j then
2: next hop = (i + j + 1) mod n
3: else
4: next hop = (i   j + 1) mod n
5: while (vi;vnext hop) is failed do
6: next hop = (next hop + 1) mod n
7: return next hop
The Rob algorithm always selects the next available neighbor as the new
next hop.
Algorithm 2 Rob
Input: current node { vi
Output: new next hop
1: next hop = (i + 1) mod n
2: while (vi;vnext hop) is failed do
3: next hop = (next hop + 1) mod n
4: return next hop
B Discussion
In this section we take a broader look at the problem and study additional
scenarios and adversarial models.
B.1 Realistic Adversary
So far, we have concentrated on a worst-case adversary which fails exactly those
links which will lead to the highest load. We now want to have a look at a more
realistic, \weak adversary" Ran, who fails links at random (independently of the
installed failover rules).
Theorem 9. Using the RFS failover scheme, in order to create a load of
p
',
Ran will have to fail at least 
 (') links w.h.p. The same results hold even if
Ran knows the destination of the trac.Proof. We build upon the proof of Theorem 5. Let us assume that Ran knows the
destination node vn. Then, it will only fail the links incident to the destination:
Consider any failover sequence i and assume that the j rst nodes in this
sequence are already in use as backup nodes. In order to make use of the node
j + 1, the adversary needs to fail either the link (i;j;vn) or the link (i;j 1;i;j).
If the adversary will fail only links to the destination vn, the probability of
reaching the node i;j+1 is at least 1=n, while a random link selection will succeed
only with probability 2=(n(n   1)). Moreover, such failures (i.e., failures of links
towards the destination) can be reused better (see Claim 4).
From the proof of Theorem 5, we know that the minimal total prex length
(i.e., the sum of all
p
'-prexes) of any node w is
'
8log n and the number of
distinct nodes in the prex is at least d =
0:4'
8log n =
0:05'
log n 
0:03'
lnn . The number
of possible total prexes is
 n 1 p
'

. We now ask the following question: if the
adversary fails r (of course r > d) random links adjacent to the destination, what
is the probability that these failures will cover at least one possible total prex?
First, we will compute the probability p1 that r random failures will cover a
single total prex (with d distinct nodes); subsequently, we will apply a union
bound argument over all possible total prexes. Simple combinatorics give us the
expression for p1:
p1 =
 n d
r d

 n
r
 =
(n   d)!r!
(r   d)!n!
:
Using Stirling's approximation for the factorial, we have:
p
2  a0:5+ae a  a!  e  a0:5+ae a:
Therefore,
p1 
e(n   d)
0:5+(n d)e
 (n d)e  r
0:5+re
 r
p
2(r   d)0:5+(r d)e (r d)p
2  n0:5+ne n
=
e
2(n   d)
0:5+(n d)r
0:5+r
2(r   d)0:5+(r d)n0:5+n

1:2n
0:5+(n d)r
0:5+r
(r   d)0:5+(r d)n0:5+n
= 1:2n
 dr
0:5+r(r   d)
 (0:5+(r d))
=
 
1:2(r   d)
 0:5
n
 dr
0:5+r(r   d)
 (r d)
 n
 dr
0:5+r(r   d)
 (r d) (3)
= e
 d ln n+(0:5+r) ln r (r d) ln (r d):The Equation (3) is true since r > d, and assuming that r   d  2, we get:
1:2(r d) 0:5  1. Now recall that d =
0:03'
lnn , and take r = dlnn = 0:03'. Then:
p1  e
 0:03'+(0:5+0:03') ln 0:03' 
0:03'(ln n 1)
ln n ln
0:03'(ln n 1)
ln n
= e
0:03'

 1+( 0:5
0:03'+1) ln 0:03' (1  1
ln n ) ln
0:03'(ln n 1)
ln n

= e
0:03'

 1+ 0:5 ln 0:03'
0:03' + ln 0:03'
ln n  (1  1
ln n ) ln ln n 1
ln n

= e
0:03'

 1+ ln 0:03'
0:1' + ln 0:03'
ln n +(1  1
ln n ) ln ln n
ln n 1

:
Using the following Taylor expansion (for a > 1):
ln
a
a   1
=  ln

1  
1
a

=
1 X
i=1
1
iai
=
1
a
+
1
2a2 +
1 X
i=3
1
iai

1
a
+
1
2a2 +
1
2a2

1
a
+
1
a2;
we obtain
p1  e
0:03'

 1+ ln 0:03'
0:1' + ln 0:03'
ln n +(1  1
ln n )

1
ln n + 1
ln2 n

= e
0:03'
ln n

  ln n+ ln 0:03' ln n
0:1' +ln 0:03'+(ln n 1)

1
ln n + 1
ln2 n

= e
0:03'
ln n

  ln n+ ln 0:03' ln n
0:1' +ln 0:03'+1+ 1
ln n   1
ln n   1
ln2 n

:
Note that '  n and thus for '  10ln
4 n,
ln0:03'lnn
0:1'

1
ln
2 n
:
We can write:
p1  e
0:03'
ln n ( lnn+ln0:03'+1)
 e
0:03'
ln n ( lnn+ln0:03n+1)
 e
0:03'
ln n ( 2:5)
= e
 0:075'
ln n :
Since e 
0:075'
ln n  e
 
'
80 log n, we can use the union bound from the proof of
Theorem 5 (see Equation (2) in that proof): we conclude that for '  822 log
4 n,
in order to create a load of
p
', a weak adversary will have to fail at least
r = dlnn = 0:03' links with probability of at least 1   1
n2. B.2 Multiple Destinations
We can also generalize the trac model: instead of having a single destination,
each node vi for all i 2 [1;:::;n] needs to send one unit of ow to each other
node vj with j 6= i. We can adapt the RFS scheme in the sense that we generate  n
2

random failover permutations, one for each source-destination pair. Note that
this corresponds to a matrix representation ; with
 n
2

rows and n   2 columns.
Again, the permutations ensure loop-freeness.
Theorem 10. Using the (generalized) RFS failover scheme, in order to load a
node with ' ows (0 < ' < n), the adversary will have to fail (') links.
Proof. In the generalized RFS, we have n(n   1) failover sequences: each set
of n   1 sequences are for a specic destination. Consider now the rst column
of this n(n   1)  (n   2) matrix. Since there are n(n   1) rows, there exists a
node w that appears at least n   1 times in the rst column. Now, for each row
i in which i;1 = w, the adversary can fail the link from vi to the appropriate
destination, thus making the ow to go through w. Hence, a single failure is
enough to bring an additional ow to w, i.e., the adversary needs at most '
failures in order to create a load of ' on w.
It remains to show that these failures cannot be reused by the adversary, i.e.,
the adversary indeed will need to invest ' failures. The argument is simple. In
order to create a load of ' on w, the adversary has to `nish' the prexes of '
sequences. In order to do so, it rst needs to fail the direct (v1;vn) link of every
such sequence, i.e., for each sequence at least this link has to be failed. But these
links are unique (each sequence serves a dierent source-destination pair) and
thus cannot be reused. The last implies that the adversary indeed needs to invest
at least ' failures. 